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With the deployment of more and more 5g networks, the limitations of 5g networks have been found, which
undoubtedly promotes the exploratory research of 6G networks as the next generation solutions. These in-
vestigations include the fundamental security and privacy problems associated with 6G technologies. Therefore,
in order to consolidate and solidify this foundational research as a basis for future investigations, we have pre-
pared a survey on the status quo of 6G security and privacy. The survey begins with a historical review of previous
networking technologies and how they have informed the current trends in 6G networking. We then discuss four
key aspects of 6G networks – real-time intelligent edge computing, distributed artificial intelligence, intelligent
radio, and 3D intercoms – and some promising emerging technologies in each area, along with the relevant se-
curity and privacy issues. The survey concludes with a report on the potential use of 6G. Some of the references
used in this paper along and further details of several points raised can be found at: security-privacyin5g-
6g.github.io.1. Introduction
Even though the era of the 5G network has not yet fully arrived, the
limitations of 5G technology mean we must begin with researching 6G
networks now. In fact, in March 2019, the world’s first 6G summit was
held in Finland, where the world’s top communications experts drafted
together with the first-ever 6G white paper. With this act, 6G networking
as a field of research was unofficially born. Since then, more and more
governments and organizations have announced the introduction of their
research projects into the 6G network. For example, the UK government
has announced its intention to invest in techniques and technologies with
potential uses in 6G networks [1], while the Academy of Finland has
announced the launch of a research project named “6 Genesis”, which
focuses on foundational research.
But what is a 6G network? And how will it differ from 5G networks?
So far, the 6G network has no standard functions or specifications, just
many possibilities. Some people contend that 6G networks should be
more than just a faster version of a 5G network, but rather the
improvement of the 5G technology in all aspects. For example, coverage
should not be limited to the ground level, as is the case with the 5G
network. Instead, it should provide full space undersea surface coverage.
The 6G network should also have much higher Artificial Intelligence (AI)u.au (M. Wang), tianqing.zhu@ut
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should be an “AI-empowered” network, meaning AI is both its driver and
most prominent feature [2]. It should not merely use AI in its architecture
as the 5G network does. The 6G network should be a deep integration of
currently emerging AI tools and networking functions. Moreover, as is-
sues on the security and privacy of networks have become increasingly
important in recent years, risk mitigation should be an integral compo-
nent of the architecture [3]. Therefore, in this paper, we will discuss the
possible additions to the 5G network that could come together to make
up the 6G network, along with the security and privacy challenges
associated with each key technology and potential applications for 6G
networks going forward. The topics discussed in this survey and how they
relate to each other are illustrated in Fig. 1.
The circles in Fig. 1 indicate the four key components of a 6G
network, which include real-time intelligent edge, distributed AI, intel-
ligent radio, and 3D intercoms. We chose these four areas as our focus
because they cover the most powerful part of the 6G study that is being
conducted so far. They are also subject to the most security and privacy
concerns. The technologies involved in the present research include the
AI-based software, the molecular communications, the quantum com-
munications, the blockchain, the TeraHertz (THz) technology, and the
Visible Light Communication (VLC) technology. As denoted in squares ins.edu.au (T. Zhu), tao.zhang-3@student.uts.edu.au (T. Zhang), Junzhang@swin.
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Fig. 1. Security and privacy issues in the 6G network.
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network applications, such as multi-sensory X Reality (multi-sensory XR)
applications, connected robotics and autonomous systems, wireless
brain-computer interactions, and blockchain and distributed ledger
technologies. These are shown as clouds in Fig. 1.
The first three areas, namely, the distributed AI area, the real-time
intelligent edge area and the intelligent radio area, contain intersecting
technologies. Moreover, AI exists at the intersection of all three areas
because we assume that 6G networks will be AI-empowered.
The five main security and privacy issues are listed below the dia-
gram. Most components of this diagram are vulnerable to authentication,
access control, and malicious behavior. However, some technologies are
particularly sensitive to certain issues. For example, the VLC, together
with both real-time intelligent edge and intelligent radio, is particularly
weak against malicious behavior and data transmission process. The
molecular communication and the THz technology both support intelli-
gent radio. The molecular communication technology is associated with
security and privacy issues concerning authentication, encryption and
communication, while the THz technology especially suffers from
authentication security and malicious behavior. The blockchain tech-
nology and the quantum communication overlap with distributed arti-
ficial intelligence and intelligent radio. The main security and privacy
concerns here relate to authentication, access control, data transmission
and encryption.
6G applications also have specific vulnerabilities. The connected ro-
botics and autonomous systems typically rely on the AI and the VLC
technology where malicious behavior, encryption and data transmission
can be problematic. The multi-sensory XR applications use the molecular
communication technology, the THz technology and the quantum
communication technology, which means they are susceptible to access
control attacks, malicious behavior, and data transmission exposure.
Wireless brain-computer interactions use the same techniques as the
multi-sensory XR application, but have their own unique security and
privacy issues. Malicious behavior and encryption are the main weak-
nesses. As the last applications of the 6G network, the blockchain and
distributed ledger technologies (mainly based on blockchain) are rela-
tively safe, but they may still be the target of malicious behaviors.
Overall, these new areas are prone to five main types of security and282privacy issues: authentication, access control, malicious behavior,
encryption and data transmission, which are hereafter denoted as S1, S2,
S3, S4 and S5, respectively. More details on how these issues affect the
various aspects of the 6G network, as well as measures to mitigate the
risks, are presented in Sections III, IV and V, respectively.
Hence, the key contributions of this survey can be summarized as
follows:
1) The security and privacy issues in the key areas of the 6G network are
identified and presented.
2) Promising key technologies to support 6G networks are outlined,
along with a detailed explanation of the security and privacy issues
relating to these technologies.
3) An overview of new security and privacy issues particular to 6G
networks is provided and discussed.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section II pre-
sents a brief overview of the technological milestones from 1G to 5G to
illustrate the historical development of these networks. Then, in Section
III, we describe the four main areas of the 6G network. The key tech-
nologies of the 6G network are discussed in Section IV, and, in Section V,
we present several 6G applications. Sections III, IV and V also contain a
breakdown of the security and privacy issues associated with each of the
topics covered. Finally, the paper concludes in Section VI.
2. Overview: 1G to 5G
In this section, we provide a high-level overview of the evolution of
security and privacy in wireless networks from first-generation technol-
ogy standard for cellular networks (1G) to fifth-generation technology
standard for cellular networks (5G), as shown in Fig. 2.
2.1. 1G
The 1G network was introduced in the 1980s and designed for voice
services. It relies on analog signals to transmit information and has no
established wireless standard. This leads to many disadvantages,
including hard handovers, a lack of security and privacy guarantees, and
Fig. 2. Evolution of security and privacy issues in wireless systems.
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that data transmissions and phone conversations can neither be secure
nor private. As a result, the entire network and its users face significant
security and privacy challenges, including cloning, eavesdropping, and
illegal access [4–6].
2.2. 2G
The 2G network is based on digital modulation techniques, such as
Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) and Code Division Multiple Ac-
cess (CDMA), which can support both voice and short message services.
The most important and widely used mobile communication standard in
2G is GSM (Global System for Mobile Communications) [7].
The purpose of the GSM is to make the system as secure as a Public
Switched Telephone Network (PSTN). Its security and privacy services
include: 1) anonymity, 2) authentication, 3) signaling protection, and 4)
user data protection [8]. Anonymity is achieved through the use of
temporary identifiers, which make it difficult to track the user’s real
identity. However, the real identity must be used when the device is first
switched on, after which a temporary identifier is issued. Authentication
is mostly used by network operators to identify users. The authentication
mechanism is an encryption-based approach referred to as “challenge
and response”. Signaling and user data protection are also implemented
using encryption, and the Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) plays an
important role in the encryption keys. There are two main methods for
preserving privacy for users: the first is radio path encryption, and the
second is Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity (TMSI) [9].
However, despite the great improvements in security and privacy over
1G, 2G still suffers frommanyweaknesses. One important security issue is
that the authentication is one-way; the network authenticates the user, but
users cannot authenticate the network, which results in security holes.
Illegal devices, such as base stations, can disguise themselves as legitimate
network members, deceiving users and stealing their information [10].
Moreover, the encryption is not end-to-end. Only part of the wireless
channel is encrypted, and there is also no encryption in the fixed network,
which provides adversaries with an opportunity for attack [11]. In terms
of privacy, the radio path encryption and TMSI have some limitations and
are exposed to various types of attacks, such as eavesdropping.
2.3. 3G
The 3G network emerged in 2000 to provide “high-speed” data
transmission and access to the internet, which means at least 2 Mbps.
However, this speed could support advanced services that are not
possible in the 1G and 2G networks, including web browsing, TV
streaming, and video services [12].283The security of the 3G system is based on the 2G technologies. That is
to say, GSM and other elements incorporated in 2G proved to be neces-
sary, while additional robust security elements also needed to be adop-
ted. The 3G also reduces some of the security weaknesses of the 2G and
introduces the Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) as well as two-
way authentication. Moreover, the 3rd Generation Partnership Project
(3GPP) provides a complete security system governing access that com-
prises two parts: air interface security, which is mainly used to protect
users and the signaling information transmitted by wireless links; and the
provision of user network authentication to ensure the physical reli-
ability of users and both sides of the network. In terms of privacy, 3GPP
incorporates some subscriber privacy requirements for 3G users, such as
confidentiality of user identity, location and traceability.
However, the 3G networks are still vulnerable to threats associated
with the Internet Protocol (IP) traffic and encryption keys. Further, the
radio interface between the terminal equipment and the service network
also provides opportunities for a set of attacks. Threats related to wireless
interface attacks fall into the following categories: 1) unauthorized access
to data; 2) threats to integrity; 3) Denial of Service (DOS); 4) unautho-
rized access to services [13]. Privacy issues are mostly related to certain
types of attacks, such as AKA error messages, designed to destroy user
identities and confidential or sensitive information.
2.4. 4G
The 4G of Long-Term Evolution (LTE) networks were introduced in
2009, providing the data rate of up to 1 Gbit/s on the downlink and up to
500 Mbits/s on the uplink. These networks provide better spectrum ef-
ficiency and reduced latency, which means they can meet the re-
quirements of advanced applications, such as Digital Video Broadcasting
(DVB), High Definition Television (HD TV) content and video chat. The
LTE integrates a mix of existing and new technologies, such as Coordi-
nated Multi-Point Transmission and Reception (CoMR), Multiple Input
Multiple Output (MIMO) and Orthogonal Frequency Division Multi-
plexing (OFDM) [14].
Examples of 4G systems include IP backbone networks, wireless core
networks, wireless access networks, and smart mobile terminals. There-
fore, the relevant security threats mainly come from these areas: wireless
link security issues, eavesdropping, tampering, insertion, or deletion of
data, and network entity authentication issues, both wireless and hard-
wired among others [15].
The 4G network is more vulnerable to security and privacy threats
than the previous networks because users interact more closely with
mobile terminals. As participants of all wireless protocols and executors
of various wireless applications, interactions via 4G become more com-
plex, and threats become more widespread. Moreover, due to
M. Wang et al. Digital Communications and Networks 6 (2020) 281–291improvements of computing and storage capabilities of mobile terminals,
an increasing number of malicious programs can be executed, which may
cause more damage. Typical examples include viruses, tampering with
hardware platforms, operating system vulnerabilities, etc. In addition,
due to defects in key management protocols, the Worldwide Interoper-
ability for Microwave Access (WiMAX) standards have some MAC layer
vulnerabilities, such as DoS, eavesdropping, and replay attacks. The LTE
networks are also vulnerable to DoS attacks, data integrity attacks, illegal
use of users and mobile devices, and Medium Access Control (MAC) layer
location tracking [16].Table 1
Summary of key areas.
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for coverage2.5. 5G
As we stand on the brink of the 5G network, we can look forward to
faster speeds, more complete systems, and more secure architectures [6].
The main advancement of 5G networks is to facilitate the connection of
an increasing number of devices and provide high-quality services for all
devices simultaneously. Moreover, the supported devices will not be
limited to smartphones; other devices like IoT equipment can also con-
nect to the network [17,18].
The security and privacy issues in 5G networks can perhaps best be
divided by network architecture and, more specifically, into three tiers of
the architecture: the access networks, the backhaul networks, and the
core network. In access networks, the diversity of nodes and access
mechanisms give rise to some new security challenges as handovers be-
tween different access technologies increase the risk of attack.
As far as the backhaul network is concerned, backhaul communica-
tion occurs between the base station and the core network, which can be
realized through wireless channels, microwaves and sometimes satellite
links, as well as wired lines [19]. In the absence of connections between
devices, these networks encounter fewer security and privacy threats
than access networks. The vulnerabilities they do have come from
adjusted elements of the access network, such as EUTRAN Node B (eNB)
or the Mobility Management Entity (MME) in the core network, although
the GPRS Tunnel Protocol (GTP) can provide some additional security
guarantees. Moreover, the backhaul network is shifted into the data
plane using Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) and
Software-Defined Networking (SDN) techniques, so that security threats
are also transmitted to the core network [20].
In 5G networks, the core network consists of functions [21]. NFV,
SDN and cloud techniques make the networks more dynamic than before,
which, again, gives rise to a greater suite of vulnerabilities. For example,
a massive number of devices and services can overwhelm the signaling
load, which leads to the increased possibility of a DoS or resource attack
[22]. So far, two methods have been developed to address signaling
overloads [23]. The first is to use lightweight authentication and key
agreement protocols to support communication for a huge number of
devices. The second involves using protocols that allow the devices to be
grouped together through various group-based AKA protocols.
In terms of security, the new techniques used to improve the perfor-
mance of the 5G network also create security holes [24]. For example,
massive MIMOs help to disguise passive and active eavesdroppings.
OpenFlow implementation of SDN increases threats from malicious ap-
plications or activities. Moreover, NFV raises security issues while a
service or function is being migrated from one resource to another [25].
There are also new privacy issues to contend with due to the diversity
of business types and application scenarios in 5G networks. The openness
of the platform can mean that a user’s sensitive information can easily
and frequently change from a closed state to an open state. Accordingly,
the contact state changes from offline to online, greatly increasing the
risk of leaks. Therefore, the privacy issues we will inevitably face with 5G
will become a problem that must be faced and solved in the next few
years. Fortunately, advancements in data mining and machine learning
technologies mean that privacy protection methods have been well
trained and will only become more powerful in the future.2843. Key areas in 6G networks
Some components of the 5G network have already been considered,
and some components have already deployed AI as their backbone, e.g.,
channel coding and estimation in the physical layer, multiple access in the
MAC layer, and various applications in the network layer [26]. However,
AI applications are not common, and the, the support for AI-driven tech-
nologies in 5G networks is limited by the constraints of the traditional
architecture that was available in the early stages of its conception.
Accordingly, there is no support for the distributed AI or the intelligent
radio, as these two areas are fully AI-based. Moreover, although the
real-time intelligent edge, such as vehicle networks, have already been
implemented for 5G networks, emergency conditions cannot be handled
in “real-time” due to latency issues. However, 6G networks can. For
example, the radio latency of 6G networks is 0.1 ms, which is one-tenth of
that of 5G networks [27].Moreover, 5G coverage is still only at the ground
level; space and underwater communications at some levels of 3D in-
tercoms are not possible. Accordingly, in the following, we will describe
how these four areas might advance in 6G networks. Of course, we also
discuss the likely security and privacy issues we expect to face in these
areas. A summary of the section is presented in Table 1.3.1. Real-time intelligent edge
Vehicle and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) networks cannot be
implemented, even in the 5G network, because controlling the whole
network requires extremely low network latency and real-time intelli-
gence, and our current technology is limited. This is particularly true for
vehicle networks. Although the 5G network already allows for the pos-
sibility of autonomous driving, and some are even already in use by AI-
based cloud services, network entities with self-awareness, self-adapta-
tion or prediction cannot be supported [28]. Accordingly, a new network
that can handle these functions is required. A 6G network should be able
to support such interactive AI-powered services. In vehicle networks, in
particular, real-time intelligent edge could allow an autonomous driving
response to an unfamiliar environment in real time [26]. Moreover, some
new technologies, such as VLC, will be particularly useful in
vehicle-to-vehicle communications [29]. When artificial intelligence
M. Wang et al. Digital Communications and Networks 6 (2020) 281–291(more specifically machine learning) is deployed in vehicle networks,
this technology will advance some basic security algorithms beyond
machine learning. But it will also present some new security challenges.
Tang et al. [30] mention that a vehicle network should consider not only
the network environment, but also the physical environment because, to
some extent, this may curtail the threat of malicious vehicles. Group
behavior in clustered vehicles should also be considered. It is worth
mentioning that a production-scale system for real-time AI to supplement
a vehicle network is already in development.
3.2. Distributed AI
Whereas 5G networks are IoT-compliant, 6G networks will need to be
IoE-compliant, i.e., the Internet of Everything (IoE). By nature, this
means the 6G network will almost certainly be a sizeable decentralized
system capable of making intelligent decisions at different levels [26].
Further, because absolutely everything in IoE is connected to the
internet, distributed artificial intelligence will be needed that should
satisfy multiple requirements. 1) The training data-set should be
distributed unevenly over most of the edge devices, while every edge
device should have the ability to access and control part of the data. The
edge device should also be able to compute and store data independently.
Also, it should be able to reduce dimensionality, clean data, and abstract
data [31]. In this way, the shared data acts as a training set beyond its
treatment as personal information. If this approach can be implemented
correctly, it can even improve the security and privacy of the network.
Some security issues associated with distributed AI have already been
identified. For example, a malicious user can update a poisoned model to
taint the entire training model. There are also some security issues at the
device level [32]. In addition, machine learning models should be
improved to ensure data integrity [33], and the end-to-end security of
communications and control would benefit from improvements [31].
Blockchain-like mechanisms are expected to solve some authentication
issues for distributed ledger technologies [34], but more work is needed
to help machine-learning models predict incoming attacks [35].
3.3. Intelligent radio
In previous generations of network, the devices and transceiver al-
gorithms were designed together. As such, the networks’ hardware ca-
pabilities, such as decoder computation, the number of antennas, etc.
have remained quasi-static [2]. However, with recent developments in
circuits and antennas, it has become possible to separate the hardware
from the transceiver algorithms, which means intelligent radio could
operate as a unified framework. Under this paradigm, the transceiver
algorithms could dynamically configure and update themselves based on
the hardware information [26].
Yang et al. [1] note that software-defined radio and networking
techniques could be combined to leverage multiple high-frequency bands
and dynamically utilize different frequencies, making support for intel-
ligent radio possible. Huang et al. [2] have presented an operating system
and interface language based on hardware information and AI methods
in which the transceiver algorithms are configurable. It has also been
argued that intelligent radio support should satisfy several requirements.
For example, the frequency band should adapt to the environment and
hardware; the spectrum sharing should be AI-enabled; hardware capa-
bilities should be estimated online, and so on. Further, Jiang et al. [36]
find evidence for some wideband interference and signal-jamming issues
in the data transmission process that could threaten data security, while
Tariq et al. [29] recommend that suspicious activities by malicious nodes
should be able to be predicted during communication processes.
3.4. 3D intercoms
In 6G networks, network analysis, planning and optimization ca-
pabilities will need to be increased over previous network generations285from two dimensions to three [37]. Accordingly, 6G networks must be
able to support communications in 3D space to accommodate satellites,
UAVs, and undersea communications. A 3D intercom could provide this
service according to the location and time needed [34]. For example,
when an emergency occurs in a remote area, deployment and response
of UAV networks are more cost-effective than using 4G or 5G networks
because the fixed infrastructure associated with these generations
cannot be relocated. Adding the dimensions of altitude and associated
degrees of freedom requires new network optimization to achieve
mobility management, routing, and resource management in the
3D-intercom context [38].
At the space level, THz bands are currently being investigated and
trialed, since satellites need to use regulated frequency bands [39].
Moreover, some new technologies, such as molecular communication
and quantum communication, could be applied here due to their suit-
ability for long-distance communication [29]. However, Wei et al. [40]
caution that there are some security issues with the authentication pro-
cess when using the Beidou navigation system. Yao et al. [41] propose a
technology called Space-Terrestrial Integrated Network (STIN), which is
a convergence of satellite communications, the internet, and mobile
wireless networking. However, this approach is impacted by some uni-
cast and multicast communication problems with key management.
At the aerial level, Zeng et al. [42] have discussed a “ghost control”
scenario in which unauthorized agents control UAVs via spoofed controls
or navigation signals. Gupta et al. [6] have discovered that one of the
security mechanisms of the protocol used in the UAV handover scenario
is too weak. In addition, Chen et al. [43] outlined an Android-based
attack method that could be used to compromise any UAV running the
Android system.
When it comes to coverage, the question of whether 6G networks
could operate underwater remains controversial due to the complex
nature of the undersea environment. However, Grimmett [44] is pio-
neering a discussion on some security issues associated with the trans-
mission processes in undersea wireless acoustic communication
networks. Thus, if it is confirmed that an undersea network will become
part of the 6G network, more security issues will inevitably emerge in the
future.
4. 6G technologies: security and privacy issues
As mentioned in the previous section, some key technologies are
already proving useful in crucial areas of the 6G network. They are giving
6G networks high reliability, low latency, and secure and efficient
transmission services. However, as also mentioned in the previous sec-
tion, most of these technologies come at the cost of new security and
privacy concerns. This is what we discuss in this section. An overview of
the security and privacy issues associated with key 6G technologies is
presented in Table 2.
4.1. AI
Compared with all other technologies expected to be used in 6G
networks, AI is widely considered to be one of the key parts of the
future network infrastructure. It is an understatement to say that
artificial intelligence has attracted a lot of attention in the field of
network. And with that attention, an increasing number of new secu-
rity and privacy issues are emerging [59]. Although AI in the 5G
network is ostensibly operated in isolated areas where massive
amounts of training data and powerful but private computing hubs are
available, AI will become more of a core component of the 6G network
[29]. Once again, AI technologies can be divided into the architectural
layers they serve [60]: the physical layers, which includes devices such
as data links and network infrastructure; and the computing layers,
which include software-defined networks, network function virtuali-
zation and cloud/edge/fog computing, etc. We discuss each in turn
below.
Table 2
Overview of the main security and privacy issues in key 6G technologies.
Key technology Ref Security and
privacy issues
Key technology contribution
AI [33] Access control Fine-grained control processes
[37] Malicious
behavior
Detect network anomalies and
provide early warnings
[45] Authentication An unsupervised learning
method that could be used in the
authentication process to
enhance the security of the
physical layers
[46] Communication An antenna design based on
machine learning that could be
used in PHY layer
communication to prevent
information leaks







molecular communication or its
processes
[49] Encryption A coding scheme that could
enhance the security of data
transmission





[47] Encryption Mechanisms for protecting
quantum encryption keys
[51] Communication Different modes of quantum
communication
Blockchain [52] Authentication A new conceptual architecture
for mobile service authorization
[53] Access control A method that improves access
protocols
[54] Communication Using hashing power to validate
transactions




Even when a signal is
transmitted via a narrow beam,
it can still be intercepted by an
eavesdropper
VLC [57] Communication A secure protocol that can be
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Zhang et al. [60] presented several AI-based technologies, including
deep neural networks, K-Means, and supervised/unsupervised learning,
which could be used in different physical layers. Not only can these
techniques improve the performance of physical layers by optimizing
connectivity, but they also have the ability to predict traffic and enhance
security. Sattiraju et al. [45] proposed an unsupervised learning method
that could be used in the authentication process to enhance the security
of the physical layer. Hong et al. [46] presented a machine
learning-based antenna design that could be implemented in the physical
layer communication to prevent information leaks. Also, Nawaz et al.
[47] noted that machine learning and quantum encryption schemes
could be used to protect the security of communication links in 6G
networks.
4.1.2. Network architecture
In the aspect of network architecture, Loven et al. [33] propose that
AI might improve edge security via security systems and fine-grained
controls. Zhou et al. [61] also discuss AI technologies, claiming that
more specific deep learning might be used to detect threats in edge
computing. However, this notion requires further exploration.2864.1.3. Other functions
In addition to the physical layers and network architecture, AI is also
useful in other respects, such as big data analysis, distributed AI, resource
management, and network optimization. Dang et al. [37] contend that AI
could help detect network anomalies and provide early warning mech-
anisms to improve the security of 6G networks. Tomkos et al. [31] further
note that by using distributed and federated AI in a 6G network, the edge
devices do not need to exchange data, which further enhances network
security. Moreover, Zhang et al. [62] mention that the impact of data
correlation in some machine learning algorithms might lead to an in-
crease in privacy leaks, and Zhu et al. [63] discuss some algorithms based
on differential privacy that could be suitable for solving some of 6G’s
privacy issues.
4.2. Molecular communication
Molecular communication is a natural phenomenon observed among
living entities with nanoscale structures [64]. Due to the development of
nanotechnology, bioengineering, and synthetic biology in the past
decade, microscale and nanoscale devices are becoming a reality [48].
Moreover, the energy consumption associated with the generation and
propagation of a molecular communication signal is very low. Although
this phenomenon has been studied in biology for many years, it has only
been a research topic in the field of communication for perhaps the last
decade. The molecular communication technology is a very promising
technology for 6G communications. However, it is an interdisciplinary
technique and one that is still in its early stages. The key idea of mo-
lecular communication is to use biochemical signals to transmit infor-
mation. Nakano et al. [65] presented a mobile molecular communication
process that enables the sender, the receiver and the associated nodes to
communicate while they are moving.
However, several security and privacy issues related to the commu-
nication, authentication and encryption process have already been
found. Farsad et al. [48] argued that this type of communication channel
could be disrupted by an adversary and that only a few studies have even
considered the safety of molecular communication links. Lu et al. [49]
presented a coding scheme capable of enhancing the security of the
transmitted data. Moreover, Loscri et al. [50] proposed some potentially
effective key directions for molecular communication that would pro-
mote the development of new authentication mechanisms to protect data
security and privacy. These authors also discuss several attack methods at
different levels of molecular communication, such as flooding attacks,
jamming, and desynchronization. Yet, while it is clear that more time is
required to develop practicable molecular communication mechanisms
for the 6G network, this technology is expected to achieve what tradi-
tional communication methods cannot.
4.3. Quantum communication
Quantum communication is another communication technology with
great application potential in 6G networks. One of its main benefits is
that it can significantly enhance the security and reliability of data
transmission. If an adversary eavesdrops on, measures or replicates
anything in quantum communication, the quantum state will be affected.
Therefore, it is not possible for the recipient to be unaware of the
interference [60]. In theory, quantum communication could provide
absolute security and, with the right breakthroughs, it should be highly
suitable for long-distance communication. It offers many new solutions
and elevates communications to a level that traditional communications
systems are unable to reach [66].
However, quantum communication is not currently a panacea for all
security and privacy issues. Although significant progress has been made
in developing quantum cryptography for quantum communication, fiber
attenuation and operation errors are making long-distance quantum
communication a serious challenge. Hu et al. [51] conjecture that several
different modes of quantum encryption and other techniques may be
M. Wang et al. Digital Communications and Networks 6 (2020) 281–291required to ensure completely secure quantum communications, such as
quantum key distribution, quantum secret sharing, quantum secure
direct communication, quantum teleportation, and quantum dense cod-
ing. Moreover, Zhang et al. [67] present further information regarding
the security of quantum secure direct communication, which can trans-
mit secret messages directly via a quantum channel without using a
private key. Nawaz et al. [47] have also discussed some of the quantum
mechanisms that use quantum key distribution models to protect key
security.
4.4. Blockchain
The Blockchain technology has many potential uses in a 6G network.
Examples include network decentralization, distributed ledger technol-
ogies, and spectrum sharing. As Dang et al. [37] observe, network
decentralization based on the blockchain technology could simplify
network management and improve network performance. The same is
true for the use of the blockchain in distributed ledger technologies,
which would significantly enhance the security of authentication [34]. In
fact, the blockchainmay turn out to be one of the most disruptive Internet
of Everything technologies [38]. Moreover, by deploying the blockchain
technology in a spectrum sharing system, the problems of low spectrum
utilization and spectrum monopoly could be overcome [60], while
securing spectrum utilization at the same time.
Blockchain security and privacy issues are related to the access con-
trol, authentication, and communications processes. Ling et al. [68]
discuss a blockchain radio access network architecture that could secure
and effectively manage network access and authentication among trust-
less network entities, while Kiyomoto et al. [52] present a new concep-
tual architecture for mobile service authorization based on the
blockchain technology. Kotobi et al. [53] further proposed a method of
using the blockchain to improve the security of media access protocols
and cognitive radio in order to gain access to the unused licensed spec-
trums. Moreover, even though the decentralized architecture of the 6G
network means it would only be possible to alter records if more than
51% of the nodes were under the hacker’s control (which means it is
secure enough), there is no trusted third party responsible for secure data
storage and management when security breaches occur [69]. Also, Fer-
raro et al. [54] mention that the hash capability required to validate
transactions in a blockchain-based network may adversely affect
security.
4.5. TeraHertz technology (THz)
Although mm-wave bands have been widely used in 5G networks,
these bands are inadequate in the 6G context owing to the demand for
high transmission rates. In any case, the Radio Frequency (RF) band is
almost full and cannot be used for future technology [70]. These factors
have spurred the development of terahertz technology. Terahertz
communication uses the 0.1–10 THz band, which has more abundant
spectrum resources than the mm-wave band. In addition, it exploits both
electromagnetic waves and light waves [60]. Huang et al. [26] highlight
several benefits of using the THz band. First, the THz communication
technology may be able to support the data rate of 100 Gbps or higher.
Second, because of the narrow beam and short pulse duration used in
THz communication, eavesdropping would be limited, resulting in higher
communications security. Third, the attenuation of THz waves through
certain materials is very small, which means they could be used in a
variety of unique applications. Moreover, THz communication trans-
mission can be highly directional, which can significantly reduce inter-
cell impact [60]. Perhaps most importantly, two types of THz physical
layers have already been specified in IEEE 802.15.3d. Strianti et al. [34]
observe that the energy consumption of the THz communication is an
obvious problem. The size of 6G cells needs to change from “small” to
“tiny”, meaning that more complex hardware and architectures need to
be designed [38].287Like other technologies, THz has its own security and privacy issues.
These mainly focus on authentication and malicious behaviors. For
instance, Akyildiz et al. [55] mention concepts such as the electromag-
netic signature of THz frequencies, which might be used for authenti-
cation processes of the physical layer. Also, although the THz
communication is widely believed to make eavesdropping difficult, Ma
et al. [56] argue that an eavesdropper could still intercept a signal when
it is transmitted via narrow beams. They do, however, discuss a way to
resist this kind of eavesdropping attack.
4.6. Visible light communication (VLC)
Visible light communication technology is a promising approach that
could be used to solve the growing demands for wireless connectivity
[71]. Far from being in its inception stages, VLC has been studied for a
number of years and has already been deployed in many areas, such as
indoor positioning systems and the Vehicular Ad Hoc Network (VANET)
network. Luo et al. [72], for example, have published hundreds of papers
related to VLC-based positioning technology.
Compared with RF which has interference and high latency, VLC has
higher bandwidths and can resist electromagnetic interference [73]. The
development of solid-state lighting has also helped to advance VLC
technology. For example, since LEDs can switch to different light in-
tensities at a very fast rate, some researchers have attempted to use LEDs
for high-speed data transmission [74]. Chen et al. [75] devised a VLC
system named LiFi that supports multiple access and could potentially
provide a large number of connected mobile users with high-speed ser-
vices. However, there are also some deficiencies that hinder the devel-
opment of VLC technology. For example, the main usage scenarios for
VLC should be indoors, because strong natural light will affect
transmissions.
The security and privacy issues related to VLC include malicious be-
haviors and communication processes. Pathak et al. [74] noted that if an
attacker wants to launch an attack on an ongoing VLC operation, they
must be in line-of-sight of the victim. Clearly, this would make the
attacker easier for attackers to be detected. Ucar et al. [57] presented a
SecVLC protocol that could be used in a vehicle network to protect the
security of transmission data. Mostafa et al. [76] proposed a precoding
technique for VLC links to enhance the security of the physical layer.
Moreover, Cho et al. [58] have verified that the cooperation of eaves-
droppers may reduce security in VLC technologies.
5. 6G applications: future research challenges
Every new era of network technology brings new and different ap-
plications. Although some applications from previous network genera-
tions will still be applied to 6G networks, the future application of the
technologies outlined in Section V is exciting. In this section, we will
review these possible developments and challenges that researchers are
currently working on. A summary of 6G applications is shown in Table 3.
5.1. Multi-sensory XR applications
The high bandwidth and low latency of 5G networks have already
improved the VR/AR experience of 5G users. However, there are still
many problems in the application of impeding VR in 5G networks, which
need to be solved in the 6G network. For example, cloud VR/AR services
can already bring some immersive experiences to users, but latency is a
significant problem, and the resulting ambiguity leads to more problems.
Deploying VR/AR through cloud services makes it more portable and
easier to access, but with 5G bandwidths, images need to be compressed,
so transmitting enormous quantities of lossless images or videos in real-
time will need to wait for the 6G network.
In 6G networks, the immersive experience of VR/AR will be further
improved. Multiple sensors will be used to collect sensory data and
provide feedback to users. Thus, the XR in 6G networks is likely to
Table 3
Overview of security and privacy issues in 6G Applications.
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(URLLC) with enhanced Mobile BroadBand (eMBB), which could be
referred to as Mobile Broad Bandwidth and Low Latency (MBBLL) [35].
The outstanding security and privacy issues with URLLC and eMBB in
multisensory XR applications include malicious behavior, access control,
and internal communication. Chen et al. [89] argue that the security of
an ultra-low latency network needs to be improved by addressing the
dynamics of the network. Chen et al. [77] also note that in a few appli-
cations of URLLC, some attacks are still difficult to defend against, so it is
still possible to leak critical and confidential information. However,
Hamamreh et al. [78] have made progress in eavesdropping and pro-
posed a technique to enhance the security against this type of attack on
URLLC services. Moreover, Al et al. [79] have devised a new
multiple-access method, called DOMA, that could be used in multisen-
sory XR applications given the capacity for mass access to XR devices in
the 6G network.
Yet Dang et al. [37] stress that the security, secrecy and privacy of
eMBB should be given more attention. Likewise, Yamakami et al. [90]
describe a 3-dimensional model of privacy threats in XR applications as a
roadmap for the issues researchers should be addressing. And Pilz et al.
[91] mention that multisensory XR applications could control the verti-
cals themselves to protect internal security and privacy.2885.2. Connected robotics and autonomous systems
The second application of the 6G network is the connected robotics
and autonomous systems. Autonomous driving is a key application in 5G
networks. In 6G networks, however, autonomous driving alone is far
from sufficient – a more comprehensive autonomous system is required.
In addition to the driving mechanics, the autonomous system should
contain a multi-dimensional network. Moreover, this system should
embed not only intelligence across the whole network, but also the logic
of AI into the network structure [26]. This would enable all internal
components to be automatically controlled and connected via AI by us.
Strianti et al. [34] discuss “industry 4.0”, which refers to reducing
human intervention in industrial processes through the use of automatic
control systems. These authors also envisioned an automated factory
capable of automatically handling the communications, computations,
caching and resource control of an entire system. In this scenario, the
automated factory contains not only mobile inspectors and actuators, but
also UAV networks, databases and cloud services, making it a truly
complete autonomous system.
The security and privacy issues related to these two applications are
discussed separately below.
5.2.1. Autonomous drone systems
Although it has not been possible so far to fully deploy an autonomous
drone system owing to the limitations of 5G networks, 6G networks could
unlock the full potential of such systems. However, there are also some
attacks against these systems. Li et al. [92] highlight that the SDN con-
trollers used to manage and control UAV networks are easy targets.
Hooper et al. [80] mention aWiFi-based attack, which could be used by a
Tiro adversary. Fotouhi et al. [81] continue to note that eavesdropping
attacks, hijacking attacks, spoofing attacks and DoS attacks can also occur
in autonomous drone systems. Accordingly, corresponding security pro-
tection mechanisms are needed. Challita et al. [93] propose an artificial
neural network-based scheme that could ensure secure real-time opera-
tions in autonomous drone systems. Sanjab et al. [83] present a novel
mathematical framework that could be used to analyze and enhance the
security of autonomous drone networks, while Sun et al. [84] present a
unique communication method that could prevent eavesdropping at-
tacks. Kim et al. [94] propose a privacy-preserving framework that could
be used to manage permission issues in UAV networks.
5.2.2. Autonomous driving systems
The security and privacy issues in autonomous driving systems
involve several different elements, for example, system-level privacy and
security issues, location privacy, vulnerable energy consumption sys-
tems. Xu et al. [95] propose an Efficient and Privacy-preserving Truth
Discovery (EPTD) approach for smart autonomous driving systems to
protect users’ security and privacy. Ni et al. [85] mention a protocol for
self-driving vehicles that could support two-factor authentication with
mutual traceability for reducing the risk of vehicle theft and also pre-
venting privacy leaks. Ding et al. [96] present a novel fuel-efficient
path-planning framework that could solve energy consumption problems
in autonomous driving systems. Wang et al. [82] warn that hackers could
use wireless network attacks to assault autonomous vehicles using
methods such as brute force cracks and packet capture. Moreover, Tang
et al. [30] present a full-scale survey of various machine learning
techniques.
5.3. Wireless brain-computer interactions
Wireless Brain-Computer Interaction (BCI) is not a new technology,
but after two decades of development, it has matured. The key idea
behind wireless BCI is to build a connection between the brain and a
device. The device can be located inside the body (such as the visual
cortex) or outside (such as an artificial limb). Typically, this involves four
steps: signal acquisition, feature extraction, feature translation, and
M. Wang et al. Digital Communications and Networks 6 (2020) 281–291feedback. Until recently, the main applications of wireless BCI were
related to health, mainly focusing on helping disabled people control
auxiliary equipment. However, in 2015, Chen et al. [97] presented a new
approach to BCI designed to help speed up spelling via brain signals. With
the coming of 6G networks, wireless BCI is anticipated to find more ap-
plications. Although somewhat similar to XR applications, wireless BCI
applications are typically more sensitive to physical perceptions and need
a guarantee of “Quality-of-Physical-Experience” (QoPE) [38].
The security and privacy issues raised by wireless BCI technology
mostly concern malicious behavior and encryption. Mccullagh et al. [98]
emphasize that data security is one of the main challenges in wireless
BCI, while Ramadan et al. [86] suggest that some hacking applications
could be developed to access highly-sensitive neurological information.
Interestingly, Vsvogor et al. [87] proposed a password method that re-
quires the user to enter a certain psychological state to prevent reply
attacks. The protection method of Karthikeyan et al. [99] not only im-
proves the already impressive features of wireless BCI, but also enhances
security levels.5.4. Blockchain and distributed ledger
Since the blockchain technology shares data with all involved
stakeholders [24], it is likely to be used for spectrum and data sharing,
thus significantly enhancing the security of 6G networks.
However, some of these issues remain particularly malicious. Nguyen
et al. [88] mention three types of malicious behavior attacks: most
vulnerability attack, transaction privacy leakage attacks, and
double-spending attacks. They also propose several blockchain-based
solutions to solve these issues in 6G networks, such as incentive strate-
gies, cryptographic algorithms, and so on. Dai et al. [100] note that while
some types of blockchains have low security, such as private blockchains,
there are still some high-level security blockchains, such as consortium
blockchains, which can be used for secure resource transactions. A
comprehensive survey of the blockchain security can be found in
Ref. [101], to which we recommend interested readers to refer.
6. Conclusion
With the 5G network research phase coming to an end and soon to be
deployed, 6G networks have become the agenda of many researchers.
The 6G network will undoubtedly bring network service to a higher level
than those of previous generations. In this paper, we conducted a detailed
investigation into the security and privacy issues related to 6G networks.
First, we presented an overview of the milestones from 1G to 5G, laying a
foundation for the development of the 6G network. We then examined
four key areas of the 6G network to uncover the security issues related to
tomorrow’s technologies. The investigation concludes with a discussion
of the potential applications that the 6G network will support. We hope
that this discussion will stimulate people's interest and further research
on 6G network security and privacy issues.
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